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Abstract—We analyze a model of learning and belief formation
in networks in which agents follow Bayes rule yet they do not
recall their history of past observations and cannot reason about
how other agents’ beliefs are formed. They do so by making
rational inferences about their observations which include a
sequence of independent and identically distributed private
signals as well as the actions of their neighboring agents at each
time. Successive applications of Bayes rule to the entire history
of past observations lead to forebodingly complex inferences:
due to lack of knowledge about the global network structure,
and unavailability of private observations, as well as third party
interactions preceding every decision. Such difficulties make
Bayesian updating of beliefs an implausible mechanism for social
learning. To address these complexities, we consider a Bayesian
without Recall model of inference. On the one hand, this model
provides a tractable framework for analyzing the behavior of
rational agents in social networks. On the other hand, this
model also provides a behavioral foundation for the variety
of non-Bayesian update rules in the literature. We present the
implications of various choices for the structure of the action
space and utility functions for such agents and investigate the
properties of learning, convergence, and consensus in special
cases.
Index Terms—Learning Models and Methods, Adaptation and
Learning over Graphs, Sequential learning, Sequential Decision
Methods, Social Learning, Bayesian Learning, Non-Bayesian
Learning, Rational Learning, Observational Learning, Statistical
Learning, Distributed Learning, Distributed Hypothesis Testing,
Distributed Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Individuals often exchange opinions with their peers in order
to learn from their knowledge and experiences, and in making
various decisions such as investing in stock markets, voting
in elections, choosing their political affiliations, selecting a
brand of a product or a medical treatment. These interactions
occur through a variety of media which we collectively refer
to as social networks. James Surowiecki in his popular science
book on wisdom of crowds [1], provides well-known cases for
information aggregation in social networks, and argues how
under the right circumstances (diversity of opinion, indepen-
dence, decentralization and aggregation) groups outperform
even their smartest or best informed members; see for example
the essentially perfect performance of the middlemost estimate
at the weight-judging competition of the 1906 West of England
Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition studied by Francis Galton
in his 1907 Nature article [2], entitled “Vox Populi” (The
Wisdom of Crowds), or the study of market reaction to the
1986 challenger disaster in [3], where its is pointed out that
the main responsible company’s (Morton Thiokol) stock was
hit hardest of all, even months before the cause of the accident
could be officially determined.
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On the other hand, several studies point out that the evo-
lution of people’s opinions and decisions in social networks
is subject to various kind of biases and inefficiencies [4]–[8].
Such deviations from the efficient and/or rational outcome are
often attributed to the structural effects that arise in networked
interactions; in particular, the predominant influence of more
central agents in shaping the group decision, in spite of the
fact that such influential agents do not necessarily enjoy a high
quality of observations or superior knowledge; cf. persuasion
bias in [9], obstructions to wisdom of crowds in [10], and
data incest in [11]. Subsequently, a better understanding of
social learning can also help us analyze the effect of such
biases and use our insights and conclusions to improve policy
designs that are aimed at implementing desirable social norms
or eradicating undesirable ones, or even to come up with more
efficient procedures for aggregating individual beliefs, and to
understand how media sources, prominent agents, government
and politicians are able to manipulate public opinion and
influence spread of beliefs in society [12].
We model the set of possible alternatives that are of common
interest to all individual in society by a set of finitely many
states of the world; and endow each individual agent with
a belief, representing her opinion or understanding of the
true state of the world. Thereby, agents exchange beliefs in
social networks to benefit from each other’s opinions and
private information in trying to learn an unknown state of
the world. The problem of social learning is to characterize
and understand such interactions and it is a classical focus of
research in behavioral microeconomic theory [13, Chapter 8],
[14, Chapter 5], [15]. Research on formation and evolution of
beliefs in social networks and subsequent shaping of the indi-
vidual and mass behavior has attracted much attention amongst
diverse communities in engineering [16]–[18], statistics [19],
economics [20], and sociology [21]. The problem of social
learning has close siblings in distributed estimation [22], [23],
data fusion [24], and statistical learning theory [25]; while
relations can be also traced to the consensus and coordination
problems that are studied in the distributed control theory [26],
[27].
Consider an agent trying to estimate an unknown state of
the world. She bases her estimation on a sequence of inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) private signals that
she observes and whose common distribution is determined
by the unknown state. Suppose further that her belief about
the unknown state is represented by a discrete probability
distribution over the set of finitely many possibilities Θ, and
that she sequentially applies Bayes rule to her observations at
each step, and updates her beliefs accordingly. It is a well-
known consequence of the classical results in merging and
learning theory [28], [29] that the beliefs formed in the above
manner constitute a bounded martingale and converge to a
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limiting distribution as the number of observations increases.
However, the limiting distribution may differ from a point
mass centered at the truth, in which case the agent fails to learn
the true state asymptotically. This may be the case, for instance
if the agent faces an identification problem, that is when there
are states other than the true state which are observationally
equivalent to the true state and induce the same distribution on
her sequence of privately observed signals. Accordingly, the
agents have an incentive to communicate in a social network
so that they can resolve their identification problems by relying
on each other’s observational abilities.
Rational agents in a social network would apply Bayes
rule successively to their observations at each step, which
include not only their private signals but also the beliefs
and actions communicated by their neighbors. However, such
repeated applications of Bayes rule in networks become very
complex, especially if the agents are unaware of the global
network structure. This is due to the fact that the agents
at each step should use their local data that is increasing
with time, and make very complex inferences about possible
signal structures leading to their observations. Indeed, tractable
modeling and analysis of rational behavior in networks is an
important problem in network economics and have attracted
much attention, [19], [30], [31].
Modeling memory constraints in the context of social learn-
ing is an important research problem [15, Chapter 5]. In recent
results, Wilson [32] considers the model of a decision maker
who chooses between two actions with pay-offs that depend
on the true state of the world. Furthermore, the decision maker
must always summarize her information into one of the finitely
many states, leading to optimal decision rules that specify
the transfers between these states. The problem of learning
with finite memory in the context of hypothesis testing was
originally formulated by [33], [34], where memory constraints
restrict the storage capacity for the test statistics. Accordingly,
while sufficient statistics are very useful computational tools
their utility for memory reduction is not clear. Subsequent
results provide sophisticated algorithms to perform the task of
hypothesis testing using test statistics that take only finitely
many values and to guarantee an asymptotically vanishing
error probability [35]–[38]. More recently, the authors in [39]
have considered this problem in a setting where agents each
receive an independent private signal and make decisions
sequentially. Memory in this context refers to the number of
immediate predecessors whose decisions are observable by any
given agent at the time of making her decision. Accordingly,
while the almost sure convergence of the sequence of indi-
vidual decisions to the correct state is not possible in this
finite memory setting, the authors construct decision rules that
achieve convergence and learning in probability. They next go
on to consider the behavior of rational (pay-off maximizing)
agents in this context and show that in no equilibrium of the
associated Bayesian game learning can occur.
To avoid the complexities of fully rational inference, a vari-
ety of non-Bayesian update rules have been proposed that rely
on the seminal work of DeGroot in linear opinion pooling [40],
where agents update their opinions to a convex combination
of their neighbors’ beliefs and the coefficients correspond to
the level of confidence that each agent puts in each of her
neighbors. More recently, [20], [41] consider a variation of
this model for streaming observations, where in addition to
the neighboring beliefs the agents also receive private signals.
Other forms of non-Bayesian rules were studied by [42] who
consider a variation of observational learning in which agents
observe the action and pay-offs of their neighbors and make
rational inferences about these action/pay-off correspondence
together with the choices made by their neighbors, but ignore
the fact that their neighbors are themselves learning from their
own observations. In more recent results, [43], [44] consider
models of autarkic play where players at each generation ob-
serve their predecessor but naı¨vely think that any predecessor’s
action relies solely on that player’s private information, thus
ignoring the possibility that successive generations are learning
from each other.
A. Motivation & Contributions
In this paper, we analyze a model of repeated interactions
for social learning when agents receive private signals and
observe their neighboring decisions (actions) at every epoch
of time. Such a model is a good descriptor for online reputation
and polling systems such as Yelp R© and TripAdvisor R©, where
individuals’ recommendations are based on their private ob-
servations and recommendations of their friends [45, Chapter
5]. The analysis of such systems is important not only because
they play a significant role in generating revenues for the busi-
nesses that are being ranked [46], but also for the purposes of
designing fair rankings and accurate recommendation systems.
Heuristics are widely used in the literature to model social
interactions and decision making [47]–[49]. They provide
tractable tools to analyze boundedly rational behavior and offer
useful insights about decision making under uncertainty [10],
[50]. They are also verified to be good descriptors for the
behavior of real world agents in the experimental studies by
Grimm and Mengel [51] and Chandrasekhar, Larreguy and
Xandri [52]. Despite their widespread applications, theoretical
and axiomatic foundations of social inferences using non-
Bayesian (heuristic) update rules have received limited atten-
tion and only recently [53], [54]. A comprehensive theory
of non-Bayesian learning that reconciles the rational and
boundedly rational approaches with the widely used heuristics
remains in demand. A chief contribution of this paper is
in establishing a behavioral foundation for the existing non-
Bayesian updates in the literature. In particular, this paper
addresses the question of how one can limit the information
and cognitive requirements of a Bayesian inference and still
ensure consensus or learning for the agents.
Some of the non-Bayesian update rules have the property
that they resemble the replication of a first step of a Bayesian
update from a common prior cf. [9]; in this paper, we formalize
and expand up on this idea. In particular, we propose the
so-called Bayesian without Recall (BWR) model as a belief
formation and update rule for Rational but Memoryless agents.
To model the behavior of such agents we replicate the time-
one update of a Bayesian agent for all future time steps. On
the one hand, the BWR model of inference is motivated by
the real-world behavior of people reflected in their spur-of-the-
moment decisions and impromptu behavior; basing decisions
only on the immediately observed actions and without regard
for the history of such actions. On the other hand, BWR offers
a boundedly rational approach to model decision making over
social networks. The latter is in contrast with the Bayesian
approach which is not only unrealistic in the amount of
cognitive burden that it imposes on the agents, but also is
often computationally intractable and complex to analyze.
B. Brief Overview & Organization of Paper
A key message of this paper is to show how the BWR
scheme can provide justification for some well-known update
rules. These rules can be equivalently explained as the update
of a Bayesian agent that naively assumes the beliefs of each
of her neighbors were formed by a private observation, and
not through repeated interaction with others. We begin by spe-
cializing the BWR model to a case where agents try to decide
between one of the two possible states and are rewarded for
every correct choice that they make. We show that the BWR
action updates in this case are given by weighted majority
and threshold rules that linearly combine the observed binary
actions and log-likelihoods of private signal. We show that
under these update rules the action profiles evolve as a Markov
chain on the Boolean cube and that the properties of consensus
and learning are subsequently determined by the equilibria of
this Markov chain.
When there are only finitely many states of the world and
agents choose actions over the probability simplex, then the
action spaces are rich enough to reveal the beliefs of every
communicating agent. We show that the BWR updates in
this second case are log-linear in the reported beliefs of the
neighbors and the likelihood of private signals. We investigate
the properties of convergence and learning for such agents in
a strongly connected social network, provided that the truth is
identifiable through the aggregate observations of the agents
across entire network. This is of particular interest, when
the agents cannot distinguish the truth based solely on their
private observations, and yet together they learn. Analysis of
convergence and learning in this case reveals that almost-
sure learning happens only if the agents are arranged in a
directed circle. We explain how the circular BWR updates
generalize to any strongly connected topology by choosing a
single neighbor randomly at every time step. We characterize
the rate of learning in such cases as being asymptotically
exponentially fast with an exponent that is linear in time and
whose coefficient can be expressed as a weighted average of
the relative entropies of the signal likelihoods of all agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
details of our BWR model for social learning are explained
in Section II. In Section III we specialize the BWR model to
a binary state and action space and investigate the evolution
of actions in the resultant Ising model. Next in Section IV
we analyze the case where the network agents are announcing
their beliefs at every epoch and the BWR updates become
log-linear. Section V concludes the paper, followed by four
mathematical appendices, labeled A to E, which provide the
detailed derivations and proofs for the technical results that
are presented throughout the paper.
II. THE BWR MODEL OF NAIVE INFERENCE
A dual process theory for the psychology of thinking
identifies two systems for the operations of mind [55]: one
that is fast, intuitive, non-deliberative, habitual and automatic
(system one); and a second one that is slow, attentive, effortful,
deliberative, and conscious (system two) [56]. Major advances
in behavioral economics are due to incorporation of this
dual process theory and the subsequent models of bounded
rationality [57]. Reliance on heuristics for decision making is a
distinctive feature of system one that avoids the computational
burdens of a rational evaluation; system two on the other hand,
is bound to deliberate on the options based on the available
information before making recommendations. The interplay
between these two systems and how they shape the individual
decisions is of paramount importance [58]. According to the
BWR model of naive inference for social learning, as the agent
experiences with her environment her initial response would
engage her system two: she rationally evaluates the reports of
her neighbors and use them along with her own private signal
to make a decision. However, after her initial experience and
by engaging in repeated interactions with the environment, her
system one takes over her decision processes, implementing
a heuristic that imitates her (rational/Bayesian) inferences
from her initial experience; hence avoiding the burden of
additional cognitive processing in the ensuing interactions with
her environment. In the following subsections we set forth the
mathematical and modeling details that allow us to implement
the BWR model in a variety of environments with different
utility, observation and information structures.
A. Signals and Environment
Consider a set of n agents that are labeled by [n] and interact
according to a digraph G = ([n], E).1 The neighborhood of
agent i is the set of all agents who communicate with agent i
and it is denoted by N (i) = {j ∈ [n]; (j, i) ∈ E}; the degree
of agent i is the cardinality of its neighborhood card(N (i)).
Digraph G is strongly connected if there are directed paths
from any agent to any other agents.
Let Θ denote a finite set of possible states of the world and
∆Θ be the space of all probability measures on the set Θ.
1Throughout the paper, R is the set of real numbers, N denotes the set of
all natural numbers, and N0 := N∪{0}. For n ∈ N a fixed integer the set of
integers {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n], while any other set is represented by
a calligraphic capital letter. The cardinality of a set X , which is the number
of its elements, is denoted by card(X ). The set difference between X and Y
denoted by XKY is the set of all elements of X that do not belong to Y .
A parameter θ ←↩ Θ is chosen arbitrarily from Θ by nature.1
Associated with each agent i, Si is a finite set called the signal
space of i and given θ, li(·|θ) is a probability mass function on
Si, which is referred to as the signal structure or likelihood
function of agent i. Let t ∈ N0 denote the time index; for
each agent i, {si,t, t ∈ N0} is a sequence of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables that take values
in Si and with the probability mass function li(·|θ). This
sequence represents the private signals that agent i observes
over time. Note that the private signals are independent over
time and across the agents.
Remark 1 (Learning from others). The fact that different
people make independent observations about the underlying
truth state θ gives them incentive to communicate in social
networks, in order to benefit from each others’ observations
and to augment their private information. Moreover, different
people differ in their observational abilities. For instance
suppose that the signal structure of agent i allows her to
distinguish the truth θ and the false state θˇ, while the two states
θˆ and θ are indistinguishable to her: i.e. `i(si|θˇ) 6= `i(si|θ)
for some si ∈ Si, whereas `i(si|θˇ) = `i(si|θ) for all si ∈ Si.
In such circumstances, agent i can never resolve her ambiguity
between θ and θˇ on her own; hence, she has no choice but
to rely on other people’s observations to be able to learn the
truth state with certainty.
For any θˇ ∈ Θ let λθˇ : ∪i∈[n]Si → R be the real valued
function measuring log-likelihood ratio of the signal si under
states θˇ and θ, defined as λθˇ(si) := log
(
`i(si|θˇ)/`i(si|θ)
)
.
This is a measure of the information content that the signal si
provides for distinguishing the false state θˇ from the truth θ.
Subsequently we work with the probability triplet (Ω,F ,Pθ),
where Ω =
(∏
i∈[n] Si
)N0
is an infinite product space with
a typical element ω = ((s1,0, . . . , sn,0), (s1,1, . . . , sn,1), . . .)
and the associated sigma field F = P(Ω). The probability
measure on Ω is Pθ(·) which assigns probabilities consistently
with the likelihood functions li(·|θ), i ∈ [n]; and in such a
way that conditional on θ the random variables si,t, i ∈ [n],
t ∈ N0 taking values in Si, i ∈ [n], are independent. The
expectation operator Eθ{·} represents integration with respect
to dPθ(ω), ω ∈ Ω.
B. Beliefs, Observations, Actions and Rewards
An agents’ belief about the unknown allows her to make
decisions even as her pay-off is dependent on the unknown
state θ. These beliefs about the unknown state are probability
distributions over Θ. Even before the true state θ is assigned
and any observations are made, every agent i ∈ [n] holds
a prior belief νi(·) ∈ ∆Θ with full support: νi(θˆ) > 0,
∀θˆ ∈ Θ; this represents her subjective biases about the true
value of θ. For each time instant t, let µi,t(·) be probability
1For a set X , x←↩ X denotes an arbitrary choice from the elements of
X that is assigned to x. The power-set of X is the set of all its subsets and
it is denoted by P(X ) = {M;M ⊂ X}. Boldface letters denote random
variables, vectors are denoted by a bar over their respective upper or lower-
case letters and T denotes matrix transpose.
mass function on Θ, representing the opinion or belief at
time t of agent i about the realized value of θ, and define
φi,t(θˇ) := log
(
µi,t(θˇ)/µi,t(θ)
)
as the log-belief ratio of
agent i at time t under the states θˇ and θ. Moreover, let
Pi,t{·} denote the probability measure on Θ×Ω that assigns
probabilities consistently with µi,t(·) and the independent
signals likelihoods, and let the associated expectation operator
be Ei,t{·}.
At t = 0 after θ ←↩ Θ is assigned, the values si ∈ Si of si,0
are realized and the latter is observed privately by each agent i
for all i ∈ [n]. Associated with every agent i is an action space
Ai that represents all the choices available to her at every point
of time t ∈ N0, and a utility function ui(·, ·) : Ai × Θ → R.
Subsequently, at every time t ∈ N0 each agent i ∈ [n] chooses
an action ai,t ∈ Ai and is rewarded ui(ai,t, θ). 2
Such modeling of rewards to actions at successive time
periods is common place in the study of learning in games
and a central question of interest is that of regret which
measures possible gains by the players if they were to play
other actions from what they have chosen in a realized path
of play; in particular, existence of update/decision rules that
would guarantee a vanishing time-average of regret as t→∞,
and possible equilibria that characterize the limiting behavior
of agents under such rules have attracted much attention, cf.
[25], [60], [61]. Under a similar framework Rosenberg et
al. [62] consider consensus in a general setting with players
who observe a private signal, choose an action and receive
a pay-off at every stage, and pay-offs that depend only on
an unknown parameter and players’ actions. They show that
in this setting with no pay-off externalities and interactions
which are purely informational players asymptoticly play their
best-replies given their beliefs and will agree in their pay-offs;
in particular, all motives for experimentation will eventually
disappear.
C. Naive (Memoryless) Action Updates
Given si,0, agent i forms an initial Bayesian opinion µi,0(·)
about the value of θ, which is given by
µi,0(θˆ) =
νi(θˆ)li(si,0 | θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)
,∀θˆ ∈ Θ. (1)
She then chooses the action: ai,0 ←↩ arg maxai∈Ai∑
θˆ∈Θ ui(ai, θˆ)µi,0(θˆ), maximizing her expected reward:
Ei,0{ui(ai,0, θ)}. Not being notified of the actual realized
value for ui(ai,0, θ), she then observes the actions that her
neighbors have taken: aj,0, j ∈ N (i). Given her extended set
2The utility functions ui(·, ·), signal structures li(·|·), priors νi(·), as well
as the corresponding sample spaces Ai, Si and Θ are all common knowledge
amongst the communicating agents for all i ∈ [n]. The assumption of common
knowledge in the case of fully rational (Bayesian) agents implies that given the
same observations of one another’s actions or private signals distinct agents
would make identical inferences; in the sense that starting form the same belief
about the unknown θ, their updated beliefs given the same observations would
be the same; in Aumann’s words, rational agents cannot agree to disagree [59].
of observations at time t = 1, she makes a second and possibly
different move ai,1 according to
ai,1 ←↩ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
θˆ∈Θ
ui(ai, θˆ)µi,1(θˆ), (2)
maximizing her expected pay off conditional on every-
thing that she has observed thus far: Ei,1{ui(ai,1, θˆ)} =
E{ui(ai,1, θˆ) | si,0, aj,0 : j ∈ N (i)}. Subsequently, she is
granted her net reward of ui(ai,0, θ) + ui(ai,1, θ) from her
past two plays.
Following realization of rewards for their first two plays, in
any subsequent time instance t > 1 each agent i ∈ [n] observes
a private signal si,t together with the preceding actions of her
neighbors aj,t−1, j ∈ N (i). She then takes an option ai,t
out of the set Ai, such that her expected utility given her
observations is maximized. Of particular significance in our
description of the behavior of agents in the succeeding time
periods t > 1, is the relation
fi(si,0,aj,0 : j ∈ N (i)) := ai,1 ←↩ arg max
ai∈Ai
Ei,1{ui(ai, θˆ)}
(3)
derived in (2), which given the observations of agent i from
time t = 0, specifies her (Bayesian) pay-off maximizing action
for time t = 1. Note that in writing (2), we assumed that the
agents do not receive any private signals at t = 1 and there
is therefore no si,1 appearing in the updates of any agent
i; and this convention is exactly to facilitate the derivation
of mapping fi : Si ×
∏
j∈N (i)Aj → Ai, from the private
signal space and action spaces of the neighbors to succeeding
actions of each agent. In every following instance we aim
to model the inferences of agents about their observations
as being rational but memoryless: as of those who come to
know their immediate observations which include the actions
of their neighbors and their last private signals, but cannot
trace these observations to their roots and has no ability to
reason about why their neighbors may be behaving the way
they do. In particular, such agents have no incentives for
experimenting with false reports, as their lack of memory
prevents them from reaping the benefits of their experiment,
including any possible revelations that a truthful report may
not reveal. Subsequently, we argue on normative grounds
that such rational but memoryless agents would replicate the
behavior of a Bayesian (fully-rational) agent between times
zero and one; whence by regarding their observations as being
direct consequences of inferences that are made based on
the initial priors, they reject any possibility of a past history
beyond their immediate observations:1
ai,t = fi (si,t,aj,t−1 : j ∈ N (i)) ,∀t > 1.
On the other hand, note that rationality of agents constrains
their beliefs µi,t(·) given their immediate observations; hence,
we can also write
ai,t ←↩ arg max
ai∈Ai
Ei,t{ui(ai, θˆ)}, (4)
or equivalently ai,t ←↩ arg maxai∈Ai
∑
θˆ∈Θ ui(ai, θˆ)µi,t(θˆ).
In the sequel, we explore various structures for the action
space and the resultant update rules fi. In Section III, we show
how a common heuristic such as weighted majority can be
explained as a rational but memoryless behavior with actions
taken from a binary set. In Section IV we shift focus to a
finite state space and the probability simplex as the action
space. There agents exchange beliefs and the belief updates
are log-linear.
III. WEIGHTED MAJORITY AND THRESHOLD RULES
Consider a binary state space Θ = {+1,−1}, and suppose
that the agents have a common binary action space Ai =
{−1, 1}, for all i. Let their utilities be given by ui(a, θ) =
21a(θ) − 1, for any agent i and all θ, a ∈ {−1, 1}; here,
1a(θ) is equal to one only if θ = a and is equal to zero
otherwise. Subsequently, the agent is rewarded by +1 every
time she correctly determines the value of θ and is penalized
by −1 otherwise (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Bipartisanship is an example of a binary state space.
We can now calculate
∑
θˆ∈Θ ui(ai, θˆ)µi,t(θˆ) =
a(µi,t(+1) − µi,t(−1)) = a(2µi,t(+1) − 1), ∀a ∈ {−1, 1};
1Extensions of the above behavioral model to rational agents with
bounded memory is of interest; nonetheless, the analysis of Bayesian update
even in the simplest cases become increasingly complex. As an example,
consider a rational agent who recalls only the last two epochs of her past.
In order for such an agent to interpret her observations in the penultimate
and ultimate steps, she needs not only a prior to interpret her neighbor’s
beliefs at the penultimate step, but also a prior to interpret her neighbor’s
inferences about what she reported to them at the penultimate step leading
to their ultimate beliefs. In other words, she needs a prior on what her
neighbor’s regard as her prior when they interpret what she reports to them
as her penultimate belief. Indeed, such belief hierarchies are commonplace
in game-theoretic analysis of incomplete information and are captured by the
formalism of type space [63], [64].
and from (4), we get1
ai,t =
{
1 if µi,t(+1) ≥ µi,t(−1),
−1 if µi,t(+1) < µi,t(−1), (5)
We can now proceed to derive the memoryless update rule fi
under the above prescribed settings. This is achieved by the
following expression of the action update of agent i at time
1. Throughout this section and without any loss of generality,
we assume that θ = −1.
Lemma 1 (Time-One Bayesian Actions). The Bayesian action
of agent i at time one following her observations of actions of
her neighbors at time zero and her own private signal at time
zero is given by ai,1 = sign(
∑
j∈N (i) wjaj,0 + ηi + λ1(si,0)),
where wi and ηi are constants for each i and they are
completely determined by the initial prior and signal structures
of agent i and her neighbors.
The exact expressions of the constants wi, ηi and
their derivations can be found in Appendix A. Indeed,
making the necessary substitutions we derive the follow-
ing memoryless update fi for all t > 1: ai,t = sign(∑
j∈N (i) wjaj,t−1 + ηi + λ1(si,t)
)
. This update rule has a
familiar format as a weighted majority and threshold function
with the weights and threshold given by wi and ti,t :=
−λ1(si,t)− ηi, the latter being random and time-varying.
Majority and threshold functions are studied in the analysis
of Boolean functions [65, Chapter 5] and several properties of
them including their noise stability are of particular interest
[66]–[68]. This update rule also appears as the McCulloch-
Pitts model of an artificial neuron [69], with important applica-
tions in neural networks and computing [70]. This update rule
is also important in the study of the Glauber Dynamics in the
Ising model, where the ±1 states represent atomic spins. The
spins are arranged in a graph and each spin configuration has
a probability associated with it depending on the temperature
and the interaction structure [71, Chapter 15], [72]. The Ising
model provides a natural setting for the study of cooperative
behavior in social networks. Recent studies have explored the
applications of Ising model for analysis of social and economic
phenomena such as rumor spreading [73], study of market
equilibria [74], and opinion dynamics [75].
Following this model, every agent i ∈ [n] chooses her
action ai,t ∈ {±1} as the sign of
∑
j∈N (i) wjaj,t−1 +
ηi + λ1(si,t). Subsequently, in processing her available data
and choosing her action ai,t, every agent seeks to maximize
(
∑
j∈N (i) wjaj,t−1ai,t + ai,t(ηi + λ1(si,t)). Hence, we can
interpret each of the terms appearing as the argument of the
sign function, in accordance with how they influence agent i’s
choice of action. In particular, the term ηi+λ1(si,t) represents
the propensity of agent i in choosing the false action θ1 := 1
at time t, and it is determined by the log-likelihood ratio of
1In writing (5) we follow the convention that agents choose +1 when
they are indifferent between their two options. Similarly, the sign function is
assumed to take the value +1 when its argument is zero. This assumption is
consistently followed everywhere throughout this paper, except in Proposition
1 and its proof in Appendix C, see the footnote therein for further details.
private signal λ1(si,t), as well as her innate tendency towards
+1 irrespective of any observations. The latter is reflected in
the constant ηi := log (νi(θ1)/νi(θ2)) + log Vi based on the
log-ratio of her initial prior belief and her knowledge of her
neighbor’s signal structures, as captured by the constant Vi in
(17) of Appendix A. The latter is increasing in `j(sj | θ1)
and decreasing in `j(sj | θ2) for any fixed signal sj ∈ Sj ,
j ∈ N (i); cf. Lemma 3 of Appendix A.
By the same token, we can also interpret the interaction
terms wjaj,t−1ai,t. Lemma 4 of Appendix A establishes that
constants wj are non-negative for every agent j ∈ [n]. Hence,
in maximizing
∑
j∈N (i) wjaj,t−1a+ a(ηi + λ1(si,t)) through
her choice of a ∈ ±1 at every time t, agent i aspires to
align her choice with as many of her neighbors j ∈ N (i) as
possible. However, in doing so she weighs more the actions
of those of her neighbors j ∈ N (i) who have larger constants
wj . The constant wj := logWj with Wj given in (18) of
Appendix A is a measure of observational ability of agent j
as relates to our model: agents with large constants wj are
those who hold expert opinions in the social network and they
play a major role in shaping the actions of their neighboring
agents. Positivity of wi for any i ∈ [n], per Lemma 4 of
Appendix A, also signifies a case of positive externalities: an
agent is more likely to choose an action if her neighbors make
the same decision.
A. Analysis of Convergence and Learning in Ising Networks
To begin with the analysis of the binary action update
dynamics derived above, we introduce some useful notation.
For all t ∈ N0, let at := (a1,t, . . . ,an,t)T be the profile of
actions taken by all agents at time t. Subsequently, we are
interested in the probabilistic evolution of the action profiles
at, t ∈ N0 under the following dynamics
ai,0 = sign
(
log
νi(θ1)
νi(θ2)
+ λ1(si,0)
)
, (6)
ai,t = sign
 ∑
j∈N (i)
wjaj,t−1 + ηi + λ1(si,t)
 , t ≥ 1, (7)
for all i ∈ [n]. The two constants wi and ηi for each agent i are
specified in Appendix A and they depend only on the signal
structure and initial prior of that agent and her neighbors.
The evolution of action profiles at in (7) specifies a finite
Markov chain that jumps between the vertices of the Boolean
hyper cube, {±1}n. The analysis of the time-evolution of
action profiles is facilitated by the classical results from the
theory of finite Markov chains with the details spelled out in
Appendix B.
If the signal structures are rich enough to allow for suf-
ficiently strong signals (having large absolute log-likelihood
ratios), or if the initial priors are sufficiently balanced (dividing
the probability mass almost equally between θ1 and θ2),
then any action profiles belonging to {±1}n is realizable
as a0 with positive probability under (6). In particular, any
recurrent state of the finite Markov chain over the Boolean
cube is reachable with positive probability and the asymptotic
behavior can be only determined up to a distribution over the
first set of communicating recurrent states that is reached by
at, cf. Proposition 2 of Appendix B. However, if a recurrent
class constitutes a singleton, then our model makes sharper
predictions: limt→∞ at almost surely exists and is identified
as an absorbing state of the finite Markov chain. This special
case is treated next due to its interesting implications.
B. Equilibrium, Consensus, and (Mis-)Learning
We begin by noting that the absorbing states of the Markov
chain of action profiles specify the equilibria under the action
update dynamics in (7). Formally, an equilibrium a∗ ∈ {±1}n
is such that if the dynamics in (7) is initialized by a0 = a∗,
then with probability one it satisfies at = a∗ for all t ≥ 1.
Subsequently, the set of all equilibria is completely char-
acterized as the set of all absorbing states, i.e. any action
profiles a∗ ∈ {±1}n satisfying P (a∗, a∗) = 1, where P :
{±1}n × {±1}n → [0, 1] specifies the transition probabilities
in the Markov chain of action profiles, as defined in (21) of
Appendix B. It is useful to express this condition in terms
of the model parameters as follows. The proof is included in
Appendix C and with a caveat explained in its footnote.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of the Equilibria). An action
profile (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) ∈ {±1}n is an equilibrium of (7) if, and
only if, −minsi∈Si a∗i (λ1(si)+ηi) ≤
∑
j∈N (i) wja
∗
ja
∗
i , ∀i ∈
[n].
Of particular interest are the two action profiles (1, . . . , 1)T
and (−1, . . . ,−1)T which specify a consensus amongst the
agents in their chosen actions. The preceding characterization
of equilibria is specialized next to highlight the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the agents to be at equilibrium
whenever they are in consensus.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium at Consensus). The agents will be
in equilibrium at consensus if, and only if, maxsi∈Si |λ1(si)+
ηi| <
∑
j∈N (i) wj ,∀i ∈ [n].
The requirement of learning under our model is for the
agents to reach a consensus on truth. That is for the action
profiles at to converge to (θ, . . . , θ) as t→∞. In particular,
as in Corollary 1, we need agents to be at equilibrium when in
consensus; hence, there would always be a positive probability
for the agents to reach consensus on an untruth: with a positive
probability, the agents (mis-)learn.
Next in Section IV we show that when the action space is
rich enough to reveal the beliefs of the agents, then the rational
but memoryless behavior culminates in a log-linear updating of
the beliefs with the observations. The analysis of convergence
and learning under these log-linear updates consumes the bulk
of that section.
IV. LOG-LINEAR UPDATE RULES
Suppose that Θ = {θ1, . . . , θm} and for all j label θj by
ej ∈ Rm which is a column vector of all zeros except for its
j-th element which is equal to one. Furthermore, for all agents
i ∈ [n] let Ai be the m-dimensional probability simplex: Ai =
{(x1, . . . , xm)T ∈ Rm :
∑m
1 xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0,∀i}; and for
all a := (a1, . . . , am)T ∈ Ai and θj ∈ Θ, set
ui(a, θj) = −‖a− ej‖22 := −(1− aj)2 −
m∑
k=1,
k 6=j
a2k.
Subsequently, we can calculate the expected pay-off from
every such action a as:
Ei,t{ui(a, θ)} = −
m∑
k=1
a2k − 1 + 2
m∑
j=1
ajµi,t(θj). (8)
Over the m-dimensional probability simplex, (8) is uniquely
maximized by a
∗
:= (µi,t(θ1), . . . ,µi,t(θm))
T . Hence, with
the probability simplex as their action space Ai and subjected
to the aforementioned utility structure, ever agnet announces
her beliefs truthfully, as her optimal action at every epoch of
time: ai,t = arg maxa∈Ai Ei,t{ui(a, θ)} ≡ µi,t(·). Therefore,
the memoryless update rule fi in (3) describes how agents’
beliefs are being updated following their observations (Fig.
2).
Fig. 2: People reveal their beliefs through status updates and
what they share and post on various social media platforms.
In Appendix D, we calculate the following Bayesian belief
at time one, in terms of the observed neighboring beliefs and
private signal at time zero.
Lemma 2 (Time-One Bayesian Beliefs). The Bayesian belief
of agent i at time one following her observations of beliefs of
her neighbors at time zero and her own private signal at time
zero is given by
µi,1(θˆ) =
νi(θˆ)li(si,0 | θˆ)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θˆ)
νj(θˆ)
)
∑
θ˜∈Θ νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θ˜)
νj(θ˜)
) ,∀θˆ ∈ Θ.
(9)
Subsequently, at any time step t > 1, each agent i observes
the realized values of si,t as well as the current beliefs of her
neighbors µj,t−1(·),∀j ∈ N (i) and forms a refined opinion
µi,t(·), using the following rule:
µi,t(θˆ) =
νi(θˆ)li(si,t | θˆ)
( ∏
j∈N (i)
µj,t−1(θˆ)
νj(θˆ)
)
∑˜
θ∈Θ
νi(θ˜)li(si,t | θ˜)
( ∏
j∈N (i)
µj,t−1(θ˜)
νj(θ˜)
) , (10)
for all θˆ ∈ Θ and at any t > 1. In writing (10), every
time agent i regards each of her neighbors j ∈ N (i) as
having started from prior belief νj(·) and arrived at their
currently reported belief µj,t−1(·) directly, hence rejecting
any possibility of a past history. This is equivalent to the
assumption that the reported beliefs of every neighbor are
formed from a private observation and a fixed prior, and not
through repeated communications.
Such a rule is of course not the optimum Bayesian update
of agent i’s belief at any step t > 1, because the agent is
not taking into account the complete observed history of her
private signals and neighbors’ beliefs and is instead, basing
her inference entirely on the immediately observed signal and
neighboring beliefs; hence, the name memoryless. Here, the
status of a Rational but Memoryless agent is akin to a person
who is possessed of a knowledge but cannot see how she
has come to be possessed of that knowledge. Likewise, it is
by the requirement of rationality in such a predicament that
we impose a fixed prior νi(·) on every agent i and carry
it through for all times t. Indeed, it is the grand tradition
of Bayesian statistics, as advocated in the prominent and
influential works of [76], [77], [78], [79] and many others, to
argue on normative grounds that rational behavior in a decision
theoretic framework forces individuals to employ Bayes rule
and appropriate it to their personal priors.
A. Analysis of Convergence and Log-Linear Learning
A main question of interest is whether the agents can learn
the true realized value θ:
Definition 1 (Learning). An agent i is said to learn the truth,
if limt→∞ µi,t(θ) = 1, Pθ-almost surely.
We begin our analysis of convergence and learning under
the update rule in (10) by considering the case of a single
agent i, who starts from a prior belief νi(·) and sequentially
updates her beliefs according to Bayes rule:
µi,t(θˆ) =
µi,t−1(θˆ)`i(si,t | θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ
µi,t−1(θ˜)`i(si,t | θ˜)
,∀θˆ ∈ Θ. (11)
The Bayesian belief update in (11) linearizes in terms of the
log-ratio of beliefs and signal likelihoods, φi,t(·) and λθˇ(·),
leading to
φi,t(θˇ) = log
(
νi(θˇ)
νi(θ)
)
+
t∑
τ=0
λθˇ(si,τ )
→ log
(
νi(θˇ)
νi(θ)
)
+ (t+ 1)Eθ {λθˇ(si,0)} (12)
Pθ-almost surely, as t → ∞; by the strong law of large
numbers [80, Theorem 22.1] applied to the sequence of Eθ-
integrable, independent and identically distributed variables:
λθˇ(si,t), t ∈ N0. In particular, if DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
:=
−Eθ {λθˇ(si,t)} > 0, then φi,t(θˇ) → −∞ almost surely and
agent i asymptotically rejects the false state θˇ in favor of the
true state θ, putting a vanishing belief on the former relative to
the latter. Therefore, the single Bayesian agent following (11)
learns the truth if and only if DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
> 0 for
all θˇ 6= θ and the learning is asymptotically exponentially fast
at the rate min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
as shown in [81].1
The preceding result is also applicable to the case of a
Bayesian agents with direct (centralized) access to all ob-
servations across the network: consider an outside Bayesian
agent oˆ who shares the same common knowledge of the prior
and signal structures with the networked agents; in particular,
oˆ knows the signal structures `i(·|θˆ), for all θˆ ∈ Θ and
i ∈ [n]; thence, making the same inferences as any other
agent when given access to the same observations. Consider
next a Gedanken experiment where oˆ is granted direct access
to all the signals of every agent at all times. The analysis
leading to (12) can be applied to the evolution of log belief
ratios for oˆ, whose observations at every time t ∈ N0 is
an element of the product space
∏
i∈[n] Si. Subsequently, the
centralized Bayesian beliefs concentrate on the true state at
the asymptotically exponentially fast rate of
Rn := min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
DKL
∏
i∈[n]
`i(·|θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
i∈[n]
`i(·|θˇ)

= min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
∑
i∈[n]
DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
. (13)
Next to understand the evolution of beliefs under the log-
linear updates in (10), consider the network graph structure
as encoded by its adjacency matrix A defined as [A]ij =
1 ⇐⇒ (j, i) ∈ E , and [A]ij = 0 otherwise. For a strongly
connected G the Perron-Frobenius theory [83, Theorem 1.5]
implies that A has a simple positive real eigenvalue, denoted
by ρ > 0, which is equal to its spectral radius. Moreover,
the left eigenspace associated with ρ is one-dimensional with
the corresponding eigenvector α = (α1, . . . , αn)T , uniquely
satisfying
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, αi > 0, ∀i ∈ [n], and αTA = ραT .
The entry αi is also called the centrality of agent i and as the
name suggests, it is a measure of how central is the location
of agent in the network. Our main result state that almost sure
learning cannot be realized in a strongly connected network
unless it has unit spectral radius which is the case only of a
directed circle.
Theorem 1 (No Learning when Spectral Radius ρ > 1). In a
strongly connected social network and under the memoryless
belief updates in (10), no agents can learn the truth unless the
1Note from the information inequality for the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence that DKL (·||·) ≥ 0 and the inequality is strict whenever
`i(·|θˇ) 6≡ `i(·|θ), i.e. ∃s ∈ Si such that `i(s|θˇ) 6= `i(s|θ) [82, The-
orem 2.6.3]. Further note that whenever `i(·|θˇ) ≡ `i(·|θ) or equivalently
DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
= 0, then the two states θˇ and θ are statically
indistinguishable to agent i: there is no way for agent i to distinguish between
θˇ and θ, based only on her received signals. This is because both θ and θˇ
induce the same probability distribution on her sequence of observed i.i.d.
signals. Since different states θˆ ∈ Θ are distinguished through their different
likelihood functions `i(· | θˆ); the more refined such differences are, the
better the states are distinguished. Hence, the proposed asymptotic rate is
one measure of resolution for the likelihood structure of agent i.
spectral radius ρ = 1.
Proof outline: A complete proof is included in Appendix
E, but here we provide a description of the mechanism and
the interplay between the belief aggregation and information
propagation. To facilitate the exposition of the underlying logic
we introduce some notation. We define a global (network-
wide) random variable Φt(θˇ) :=
∑n
i=1 αiφi,t(θˇ), where αi is
the centrality of agent i and Φt(θˇ) characterizes how biased
(away from the truth and towards θˇ) the network beliefs and
priors are at each point in time. In particular, if any agent is to
learn the truth, then Φt(θˇ)→ −∞ as t→∞ for all the false
states θˇ ∈ ΘK{θ}. To proceed, we define another network-wide
random variable Λt(θˇ) :=
∑n
i=1 αiλθˇ(si,t) which character-
izes the information content of the observed signals (received
information) for the entire network, at each time t. Moreover,
since the received signal vectors {(s1,t, . . . , sn,t), t ∈ N0}
are i.i.d. over time, ∀θˇ 6= θ, {Λt(θˇ), t ∈ N0} constitutes a
sequence of i.i.d. random variables satisfying E
{
Λt(θˇ)
}
=
−∑ni=1 αiDKL (`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)) 6 0. In order for the agents
to learn the true state of the world based on their observations,
it is necessary that at each false state θˇ 6= θ some agent be
able to distinguish θˇ from the truth θ, in which case E
{
Λt(θˇ)
}
< 0, and we can refer to this criterion as global identifiablity
for the true state θ.1
In Appendix E we argue that under the update rules in (10)
the global belief ratio statistics Φt(θˇ) evolves as a sum of
weighted i.i.d. variables ρτΛt−τ (θˇ):
Φt(θˇ) =
t∑
τ=0
ρτ
(
Λt−τ (θˇ) + (1− ρ)β(θˇ)
)
, (14)
where β(θˇ) :=
∑n
i=1 αi log
(
νi(θˇ)/νi(θ)
)
is a measure of
bias in the initial prior beliefs. The weights in (14) form
a geometric progressions in ρ; hence, the variables increase
unbounded in their variance and convergence cannot hold true
in a strongly connected social network, unless ρ = 1. This is
due to the fact that ρ upper bounds the average degree of the
graph [84, Chapter 2], and every node in a strongly connected
graph has degree greater than or equal to one, subsequently
ρ ≥ 1 for all strongly connected graphs. 
Remark 2 (Polarization, data incest and unlearning). The
unlearning in the case of ρ > 1 in Theorem 1, which applies
to all strongly connected topologies except directed circles
(where ρ = 1, see Subsection IV-B below), is related to
the inefficiencies associated with social learning and can be
attributed to the agents’ naivety in inferring the sources of
their information, and their inability to interpret the actions of
their neighbors rationally [85]. In particular, when ρ > 1 the
noise or randomness in the agents’ observations is amplified
at every stage of network interactions; since the agents fail to
1The global identifiability condition can be also viewed in the following
sense: consider a gedanken experiment where an external fully rational
observer oˆ is granted direct access to all the signals of all agents in the
network and assume further that she shares the same common knowledge of
the prior and signal structures with the network agents. Then oˆ learns the
truth if, and only if, it is globally identifiable.
correct for the repetitions in the sources of their observations
as in the case of persuasion bias argued by DeMarzo, Vayanos
and Zwiebel [9], or data incest argued by Krishnamurthy and
Hoiles [11]. When ρ > 1 the effect of the agents’ priors is also
amplified through the network interactions and those states θˆ
for which β(θˆ) > 0 in (14), will be asymptotically rejected as∑t
τ=0 ρ
τ (1 − ρ)β(θˇ) → −∞, irrespectively of the observed
data Λτ (θˇ), τ ∈ N0. This phenomenon arises as agents
engage in excessive anti-imitative behavior, compensating for
the neighboring priors at every period [44]. It is justified
as a case of choice shift toward more extreme opinions [5],
[6] or group polarization [7], [8], when like-minded people
after interacting with each other and under the influence of
their mutually positive feedback become more extreme in their
opinions, and less receptive of opposing beliefs.
B. Learning in Circles and General Connected Topologies
For a strongly connected digraph G, if ρ = 1, then it has
to be the case that all nodes have degree 1 and the graph is
a directed circle. Subsequently, the progression for Φt(θˇ) in
(14) reduces to sum of i.i.d. variables in L1 and by the strong
law of large numbers [80, Theorem 22.1], it converges almost
surely to the mean value
Φt(θˇ) = β(θˇ) +
t∑
τ=0
Λτ (θˇ)→ β(θˇ) + (t+ 1)E
{
Λ0(θˇ)
}
→ −∞,
as t → ∞, provided that E{Λ0(θˇ)} < 0, i.e. if the truth is
globally identifiable. Note also the analogy with (12), where
Λt(θˇ) is replaced by λθˇ(si,t) as both represent the observed
signal(s) or received information at time t. Indeed, if we
further assume that νi(·) ≡ ν(·) for all i, i.e. all agents
share the same common prior, then (10) for a circular network
becomes
µi,t(θˆ) =
µj,t−1(θˆ)`i(si,t | θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ
µj,t−1(θ˜)`i(si,t | θ˜)
,∀θˆ ∈ Θ, (15)
where j ∈ [n] is the unique vertex j ∈ N (i). Update (15) repli-
cates the Bayesian update of a single agents in (11) but the self
belief µi,t−1(·) on the right-hand side being is replaced by the
belief µj,t−1(·) of the unique neighbor {j} = N (i). Indeed,
the learning in this case is asymptotically exponentially fast at
the rate (1/n) min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
∑n
j=1DKL
(
`j(·|θ)||`j(·|θˇ)
)
= 1/3R3;
hence, the same exponential rate as that of a central Bayesian
can be achieved through the BWR update rule, except for a
1/n factor that decreases with the increasing cycle length, cf.
[81].
Example 1 (Eight Agents with Binary Signals in a Tri-State
World.). Consider the network of agents in Fig. 3 with the
true state of the world being 1, the first of the tree possible
states Θ = {1, 2, 3}. The agents receive binary signals about
the true state θ according to the likelihoods listed in the table.
12
5
4
3
6
7
8
likelihoods θˆ = 1 θˆ = 2 θˆ = 3
l1(s1,t = 0 | θˆ) 13 13 15
l2(s2,t = 0 | θˆ) 12 23 12
l3(s3,t = 0 | θˆ) 14 14 14
Fig. 3: A hybrid structure
We begin by the observation that this network can be
thought of as a rooted directed tree, in which the root node
is replaced with a directed circle (the root circle).1 Next note
that the root circle is comprised of three agents and none of
them can learn the truth on their own. Indeed, agent 3 does
not receive any informative signals; therefore, in isolation i.e.
using (11), her beliefs shall never depart from their initial
priors. We further set lj(· | ·) ≡ l3(· | ·) for all j ∈ [8]K[3],
so that all the peripheral follower agents are also unable to
infer anything about the true state of the world from their own
private signals.
Starting from a uniform common prior and following the
proposed rules (15), all agents asymptotically learn the true
state, even though none of them can learn the true state on
their own. The plots in Figs. 4 and 5 depict the evolutions
of the beliefs for the third agent as well as the difference
between the beliefs for the first and eighth agents. We can
further show that all agents learn the true state at the same
exponentially fast asymptotic rate. In fact, the three nodes
belonging to the directed circle learn the true state of the world
at the exponentially fast asymptotic rate of (1/3)R3 noted
above, irrespectively of the peripheral nodes. The remaining
peripheral nodes then follow up with the beliefs of root circle
nodes, except for a vanishing difference that increases with the
increasing distance of a peripheral node from the root circle:
following (15), the first three agents form a circle of leaders
where they combine their observations and reach a consensus;
every other agent in the network then follows whatever state
that the leaders have collectively agreed upon.
In [86] the authors show the application of the up-
date rule in (15) to general strongly connected topologies
1Any weakly connected digraph G which has only degree zero or degree
one nodes can be drawn as a rooted tree, whose root is replaced by a directed
circle, a so-called root circle. This is true since any such digraph can have at
most one directed circle and all other nodes that are connected to this circle
should be directed away from it, otherwise G would have to include a node
of degree two or higher.
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Fig. 4: Evolution of the third agent’s beliefs over time
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Fig. 5: The difference between the first and eighth agents’
beliefs over time
where agents have more than just a single neighbor in
their neighborhoods. It is proposed to choose a neighbor
j ∈ N (i) independently at random every time and then
apply (15) with the reported belief from that neighbor. Here
again if the truth is globally identifiable, all agents learn
the truth at an asymptotically exponentially fast rate given
by min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
∑n
j=1 pijDKL
(
`j(·|θ)||`j(·|θˇ)
)
, where pij are the
probabilities in the stationary distribution of the Markov chain
whose transition probabilities are the same as the probabilities
for the random choice of neighbors at every point in time.1 It
is notable that the asymptotic rate here is a weighted average
of the KL distances DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
, in contrast with
the arithmetic (unweighted) mean (1/nRn) that arise in the
circular case. Both rates are upper bounded by the centralized
Bayesian learning rate of Rn calculated in (13). Finally, we
point out that the rate of distributed learning upper bounds
the (weighted) average of individual learning rates. It is due
to the fact that observations of different agents complement
each other, and while one agent may be good at distinguishing
one false state from the truth, she can rely on observational
abilities of other agents for distinguishing the remaining false
states: consider agents 1 and 2 in Example 1, the former can
distinguish θˆ = 2 from θ = 1, while the latter is good at
distinguishing θˆ = 3 from θ = 1; together they can distinguish
all states. Hence, the overall rate of distributed learning upper
bounds the average of individual learning rates, and is itself
upper bounded by the learning rate of a central Bayesian agent:
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
< min
θˇ∈ΘK{θ}
1
n
n∑
i=1
DKL
(
`i(·|θ)||`i(·|θˇ)
)
=
1
n
Rn < Rn.
Fixing the priors over time will not result in convergence
of beliefs, except in very specific cases as discussed above.
In [90] we investigate the properties of convergence and
learning under the update rules in (10), where the priors
νj(·) are replaced by time-varying distributions ξi,j(·, t) that
parametrize the log-linear updating of the agents’ beliefs over
time. It is notable that the memoryless Bayesian update in
(10) has a log-linear structure similar to non-Bayesian update
rules studied in the literature [91]–[95]; the roots for such a
geometric averaging of the neighboring beliefs is traced to
logarithmic opinion pools [96], [97] and can be also justified
under specific behavioral assumptions [53].
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work addressed a social and observational learning
model in social networks. Agents attempt to learn some un-
known state of the world which belongs to a finite state space.
Conditioned on the true state, a sequence of i.i.d. private sig-
nals are generated and observed by each agent of the network.
The private signals do not provide each agent with adequate
information to identify the truth. Hence, agents interact with
their neighbors to augment their imperfect observations with
those of their neighbors. We proposed a belief aggregation and
1In many distributed learning models over random and switching net-
works, agents must have positive self-reliant at any time; as for instance in
gossip algorithms [87] and ergodic stationary processes [88]. This condition
however is relaxed under (15), as our agents rely entirely on the beliefs of
their neighbors every time that they select a neighbor to communicate with.
Moreover, unlike the majority of results that rely on the convergence properties
of products of stochastic matrices and are applicable only to irreducible and
aperiodic communication matrices, cf. [10, Proporition 1]; the convergence
results in [86] do not require the transition probability matrix to be aperiodic,
as it relies on properties of ergodic Markov chains and holds true for any
irreducible, finite-state chain [89, Theorems 1.5.6 and 1.7.7].
inference scheme that we call Bayesian without Recall (BWR),
as a behavioral model to interpret and provide justification for
the variety of non-Bayesian update rules that are suggested in
the literature. Accordingly, by replicating the rule that maps
the initial priors, neighbor’s decisions, and the private signal to
Bayesian posterior at one time step for all future time steps,
one can derive non-Bayesian updates with well-known and
intuitive structures, such as majority rules or log-linear belief
updates.
Following the BWR approach, the complexities of a fully
rational inference at the forthcoming epochs are avoided, while
some essential features of Bayesian inference are preserved.
We analyzed the specific form of BWR updates in two cases
of binary state and action space, as well as a finite state space
with actions taken over the probability simplex. In the case
of binary actions the BWR updates take the form of a linear
majority rule, whereas if the action spaces are rich enough for
the agents to reveal their beliefs, then belief updates take a
log-linear format. In each case we investigate the properties of
convergence, consensus and learning; the latter is of particular
interest, in a strongly connected social network when the truth
is identifiable through the aggregate private observations of all
individuals but not individually.
On the one hand, the specific forms of the BWR update
rules in each case help us to better understand the mechanisms
of naive inference, when rational agents are devoid of their
ability to make recollections. On the other hand, our results
also highlight the consequences of such naivety in shaping the
mass behavior; by comparing our predications with the rational
learning outcomes. In particular, we saw in Subsection III-B
that there is a positive probability for rational but memoryless
agents in an Ising model to mis-learn by reaching consensus on
an untruth. However Bayesian (fully rational) beliefs constitute
a bounded martingale; hence, when truth is identifiable and
number of observations increases, the beliefs of rational agents
converge almost surely to a point mass centered at the true
state [28], [29]. Similarly Theorem 1 states the impossibility of
asymptotic learning under the BWR belief updates, whenever
the spectral radius of the interconnection graph adjacency is
greater than one.
Last but not least, we pinpoint a key difference between the
BWR action and belief updates: the former are weighted up-
dates, wheras the latter are unweighted symmetric updates. Ac-
cordingly, an agent weighs each neighbor’s action differently
and in accordance with the quality of private signals which are
inferred from actions. On the other hand, when communicating
their beliefs the quality of each neighbor’s signal is already
internalized in their reported belief; hence, when incorporating
her neighboring beliefs, an agent regards the reported beliefs
of all her neighbors equally, and irrespective of the quality of
their private signals.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: TIME-ONE BAYESIAN ACTIONS
Note that given her observation of private signal si,0, the
posterior probability assigned by agent i to the set θ1 is given
by (1) with θˆ = θ1. We form a dichotomy of the signal space
Si of each agent into S1i and S−1i ; by setting S1i := {s ∈
Si : `i(s|θ1)νi(θ1) ≥ `i(s|θ2)νi(θ2)} and S−1i := Si \ S1i . It
thus follows from (6) that for any j ∈ N (i) the observation
that aj,0 = 1 is equivalent to the information that {sj,0 ∈ S1j }
and aj,0 = −1 is equivalent to the information that {sj,0 ∈
S−1j }. Thereby, the belief of agent i at time t = 1 given her
observation of the actions of her neighbors and the private
signal sj,0 is given by
µi,1(θ1) =
`i(si,0|θ1)
∏
j∈N (i)
 ∑
sj∈S
aj,0
j
`j(sj |θ1)
 νi(θ1)
∑
θˆ∈Θ
`i(si,0|θˆ)
∏
j∈N (i)
 ∑
sj∈S
aj,0
j
`j(sj |θˆ)
 νi(θˆ)
,
and we can thus form the ratio
µi,1(θ1)
µi,1(θ2)
=
`i(si,0|θ1)νi(θ1)
`i(si,0|θ2)νi(θ2)
∏
j∈N (i)

∑
sj∈S
aj,0
j
`j(sj |θ1)
∑
sj∈S
aj,0
j
`j(sj |θ2)

=
`i(si,0|θ1)νi(θ1)
`i(si,0|θ2)νi(θ2)Vi
∏
j∈N (i)
W
aj,0
j , (16)
where for all i ∈ [n] we have defined
Vi =
∏
j∈N (i)

∑
sj∈S1j
`j(sj |θ1)
∑
sj∈S1j
`j(sj |θ2)
×
∑
sj∈S−1j
`j(sj |θ1)
∑
sj∈S−1j
`j(sj |θ2)

1/2
(17)
Wi =

∑
si∈S1i
`i(si|θ1)∑
si∈S1i
`i(si|θ2)
×
∑
si∈S−1i
`i(si|θ2)
∑
si∈S−1i
`i(si|θ1)

1/2
. (18)
Furthermore let wi := logWi and ηi := log(Viνi(θ1)/νi(θ2))
be constants that are determined completely by the initial
prior and signal structures of each agent and her neighbors.
Subsequently, taking logarithms of both sides in (16) yields
the following update rule for the log-ratio of the beliefs at
time one,
log
(
µi,1(θ1)
µi,1(θ2)
)
=
∑
j∈N (i)
wjaj,0 + ηi + λ1(si,0). (19)
Finally, we can apply (5) to derive the claimed expression in
Lemma 1 for the updated Bayesian action of agent i following
her observations of her neighbors’ actions aj,0, j ∈ N (i) and
her own private signal si,0. We end our derivation by pointing
out some facts concerning constants ηi and wi which appear
in (19).
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of ηi). Consider any i ∈ [n] and
fix a signal sj ∈ Sj for some j ∈ N (i). It holds true that
the constant ηi is increasing in `j(sj | θ1) and decreasing in
`j(sj | θ2).
Proof. The claim follows directly from the defining relation
ηi = log(νi(θ1)/νi(θ2))+log Vi, as replacing from (17) yields
log Vi = +
1
2
∑
j∈N (i)
log
∑
sj∈S1j
`j(sj |θ1)
+
1
2
∑
j∈N (i)
log
∑
sj∈S−1j
`j(sj |θ1)
− 1
2
∑
j∈N (i)
log
∑
sj∈S1j
`j(sj |θ2)
− 1
2
∑
j∈N (i)
log
∑
sj∈S−1j
`j(sj |θ2). (20)
The proof now follows upon the realization that for any fixed
sj ∈ Sj , j ∈ N (i) the term `j(sj | θ1) appears in one of the
first two terms appearing with a plus sign in (20), and the term
`j(sj | θ2) appears in one of the last first two terms appearing
with a minus sign in (20). Hence, when all else kept constant,
log Vi and subsequently ηi is increasing in `j(sj | θ1) and
decreasing in `j(sj | θ2).
Lemma 4 (Positivity of wi). It holds true for any i ∈ [n] that
wi ≥ 0.
Proof. First note from the definitions of the sets S1i and S−1i
that ∀s ∈ S1i ,
`i(s|θ1)
`i(s|θ2) ≥
νi(θ2)
νi(θ1)
, and ∀s ∈ S−1i ,
`i(s|θ2)
`i(s|θ1) >
νi(θ1)
νi(θ2)
.
Next we sum the numerators and denominators of the likeli-
hood ratios of the signals in each of sets S1i and S−1i ; invoking
basic algebraic properties from the resultant fractions yields∑
s∈S1i
`i(s|θ1)∑
s∈S1i
`i(s|θ2) ≥
νi(θ2)
νi(θ1)
, and
∑
s∈S−1i
`i(s|θ2)∑
s∈S−1i
`i(s|θ1) >
νi(θ1)
νi(θ2)
.
Subsequently, replacing form (18) yields that
Wi :=
∑
s∈S1i
`i(s|θ1)∑
s∈S1i
`i(s|θ2) ×
∑
s∈S−1i
`i(s|θ2)∑
s∈S−1i
`i(s|θ1) ≥
νi(θ2)
νi(θ1)
× νi(θ1)
νi(θ2)
= 1,
and proof follows from the defining relation wi := logWi ≥
0.
APPENDIX B
A MARKOV CHAIN ON THE BOOLEAN CUBE
To begin, for any vertex of the Boolean hypercube a :=
(a1, . . . , an)
T ∈ {±1}n and each agent i, define the function
pii : {±1}n → [0, 1] as pii(a) := P{ai,t+1 = +1 | at =
a} = Pθ{−λ1(si,t+1) ≤
∑
j∈N (i) wjaj + ηi}. The transition
probabilities for the Markov chain of action profiles on the
Boolean hypercube are given by
P (a′, a) := P{at+1 = a′ | at = a}
=
∏
i:a′i=+1
pii(a)
∏
i:a′i=−1
(1− pii(a)), (21)
for all t ∈ N0 and any pair of vertices a′ := (a′1, . . . , a′n)T ∈
{±1}n and a ∈ {±1}n.
It follows from the classification of states and chains in
[98, Section 2.4] that {±1}n can be partitioned into sets of
transient communication classes: C′1, . . ., C′r′ , and recurrent
(ergodic) communication classes: C1, . . ., Cr. Moreover, as
t → ∞, at almost surely belongs to ∪i∈[r]Ci. It is further
true that if at0 ∈ Ci for some i ∈ [r] and t0 ∈ N, then
at ∈ Ci almost surely for all t ≥ t0: the process will almost
surely leave any set of transient action profiles, i.e. ∪i∈[r′]C′i,
and will almost surely remain in the first recurrent set that it
reaches before any other. Let r∗ := arg minρ∈[r]{t : at ∈ Cρ}
be the random variable that determines the first ergodic set of
action profiles that is reached by the Markov chain process
{at, t ∈ N0}; suppose τ := card(Cr∗) and further denote
Cr∗ := {a∗1, . . . ,a∗τ}. The asymptotic behavior of the process
can now be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 (Asymptotic Distribution of Action Profiles).
Let p := (p1, . . . ,pτ )T be the stationary distribution over
Cr∗ which uniquely satisfies pk
∑τ
j=1 P (a
∗
k,a
∗
j ) =
∑τ
j=1
P (a∗k,a
∗
j )pj , for all k ∈ [τ ]. Then P{limt→∞ at = a∗k} = pk,
for all k ∈ [τ ]. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
EQUILIBRIUM ACTION PROFILES
Any equilibrium a∗ := (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) of (7) should satisfy
a∗i = sign(
∑
j∈N (i) wja
∗
j+ηi+λ1(si,t)), with probability one
for all i and t. Hence, a∗ ∈ {±1}n is an equilibrium of (7) if,
and only if, −λ1(si) ≤
∑
j∈N (i) wja
∗
j+ηi,∀si ∈ Si whenever
a∗i = 1, and −λ1(si) ≥
∑
j∈N (i) wja
∗
j + ηi,∀si ∈ Si when-
ever a∗i = −1. By multiplying both sides of the inequalities by
a∗i in each case and reordering the terms we derive the claimed
characterization of the equilibria or the absorbing states under
the action update dynamics in (7).1 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: TIME-ONE BAYESIAN BELIEFS
We begin by applying the Bayes rule to the observation
of agent i at time 1 which include her neighbors’ initial
1Here, and in writing the conditions for the case of a∗i = −1 as
non-strict inequalities we have violated our earlier convention that agents
choose +1 when they are indifferent between +1 and −1. Instead, we are
assuming that ties are broken in favor of the equilibrium action profile. This
assumption facilitates compact expression of the characterizing conditions
for the equilibrium action profiles, and it will have no effect unless with
some pathological settings of the signal structure and priors leading to∑
j∈N (i) wja
∗
j + ηi = 0 for some si ∈ Si, i ∈ [n].
beliefs {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)} as well as her private signal si,0.
Accordingly, for any θˆ ∈ Θ:
µi,1(θˆ) = Pi,0
(
θˆ | si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}
)
(22)
=
Pi,0(θˆ, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)})
Pi,0(si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}) ,
=
Pi,0(θˆ, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)})∑
θ˜∈Θ Pi,0(θ˜, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)})
.
The succeeding steps follow those in [99] for the case of two
communicating agents. For any j ∈ [n] and all pi(·) ∈ ∆Θ,
define the correspondence Ij : ∆Θ → P(Sj) and function
Kj : ∆Θ→ R, given by:
Ij(pi(·)) = {s ∈ Sj : pi(θˆ) = νj(θˆ)lj(s | θˆ)∑
θ˜∈Θ νj(θ˜)lj(s | θ˜)
,∀θˆ ∈ Θ},
Kj(pi(·)) =
∑
s∈Ij(pi(·))
∑
θ˜∈Θ
νj(θ˜)lj(s | θ˜). (23)
In (23), Ij(pi(·)) signifies the set of private signals for agent
j, which are consistent with the observation of belief pi(·) in
that agent. By the same token, Kj(pi(·)) in (23) is the ex-
ante probability for the event that the private signal of agent
j belongs to the set Ij(pi(·)).
The terms Pi,0(θ˜, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}) for θ˜ ∈ Θ,
which appear in the both numerator and denominator of (22)
can be simplified by conditioning on the neighbors’ observed
signals {sj,0; j ∈ N (i)} as follows in (24).
Pi,0(θ, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}) =
∑
sj∈Sj ,
j∈N (i)
P(θ, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)} | {sj,0 = sj ; j ∈ N (i)})× . . .
. . .Pi,0({sj,0 = sj ; j ∈ N (i)}). (24)
We next express Pi,0(·) in terms of the priors and signal
structures leading to:
Pi,0(θ˜, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}) (25)
=
∑
{sj∈Ij(µj,0(·)),j∈N (i)}
νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)
∏
j∈N (i)
lj(sj | θ˜)
=
νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)∏
j∈N (i) νj(θ˜)
∏
j∈N (i)
 ∑
sj∈
Ij(µj,0(·))
νj(θ˜)lj(sj | θ˜)
 .
Bayes rule in (1), together with the functions defined in (23),
can now be used to eliminate the product terms involving sj
from (25) and get:
Pi,0(θ˜, si,0, {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}) = νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)∏
j∈N (i) νj(θ˜)
× (26)
. . .×
∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θ˜) ∑
sj∈Ij(µj,0(·))
∑
θ¯∈Θ
νj(θ¯)lj(s | θ¯)

= νi(θ˜)li(si,0 | θ˜)
 ∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θ˜)
νj(θ˜)
 ∏
j∈N (i)
Kj(µj,0(·)).
Upon replacing (26) in (22), the product terms involving
Kj(µj,0(·)) cancel out and (9) follows. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: NO LEARNING WHEN ρ > 1
We begin the analysis of the beliefs propagation under (10)
by forming the ratio
µi,t(θˇ)
µi,t(θ)
=
νi(θˇ)
νi(θ)
× li(si,t | θˇ)
li(si,t | θ) ×
∏
j∈N (i)
µj,t−1(θˇ)
µj,t−1(θ)
× νj(θ)
νj(θˇ)
,
for any false state θˇ ∈ ΘK{θ} and each agent i ∈ [n] at
all times t ∈ N. The above has the advantage of removing
the normalization factor in the dominator out of the picture;
thence, focusing instead on the evolution of belief ratios, which
has a log-linear format. The latter motivates definitions of log-
likelihood ratios for signals, beliefs, and priors as follows.
Similarly to λθˇ(si,t) and φi,t(θˇ), define the log-ratios of prior
beliefs as γi(θˇ) := log
(
νi(θˇ)/νi(θ)
)
. Starting from the above
iterations for the belief ratio and taking the logarithms of both
sides yields
φi,t(θˇ) = γi(θˇ) + λθˇ(si,t) +
∑
j∈N (i)
φj,t−1(θˇ)− γj(θˇ). (27)
Multiplying both sides of (27) by αi, which is the centrality
of agent i, and summing over all i ∈ [n] yields that
Φt(θˇ) =
n∑
i=1
αiγi(θˇ) +
n∑
i=1
αiλθˇ(si,t) (28)
+
n∑
i=1
αi
∑
j∈N (i)
(φj,t−1(θˇ)− γj(θˇ)).
First note that we can write
n∑
i=1
αiγi(θˇ)−
n∑
i=1
αi
∑
j∈N (i)
γj(θˇ) = tr
{(
I −AT )αγ (θˇ)T}
= (1− ρ)β(θˇ), (29)
where γ(θˇ) := (γ1(θˇ), . . . , γn(θˇ))T . Next note that by the
choice of α as the eigenvector corresponding to the ρ eigen-
value of matrix A we get
n∑
i=1
αi
∑
j∈N (i)
φj,t−1(θˇ) = α
T
Aφt−1(θˇ) = ρα
T
φt−1(θˇ)
= ρΦt−1(θˇ). (30)
where φt(θˇ) := (φ1,t(θˇ), . . . ,φn,t(θˇ))
T . Now replacing (29)
and (30) in (28) yields the following recursion for Φt(θˇ):
Φt(θˇ) = Λt(θˇ) + ρΦt−1(θˇ) + (1− ρ)β(θˇ), (31)
initialized by Φ0(θˇ) = β(θˇ) + Λ0(θˇ), where β(θˇ) :=∑n
i=1 αi log
(
νi(θˇ)/νi(θ)
)
is a constant that is determined by
the initial prior beliefs, and it measures the total bias in the
network relative between the two states θˇ and θ. In particular,
if the agents are unbiased starting from uniform priors on Θ,
then β(θˇ) = 0, ∀θˇ ∈ Θ. Note also that the assumption of full
support priors implies that |β(θˇ)| is finite. By iterating (31) for
t ∈ N we obtain (14). Next note that in a strongly connected
graph every node has a degree greater than or equal to one so
that ρ ≥ 1, [84, Chapter 2]. If ρ > 1, then the term ρtΛ0(θˇ)
increases in variance as t → ∞, and unless Λ0(θˇ) <  with
Pθ-probability one for some  < 0, almost sure convergence
to −∞ for Φt(θˇ) in (14) cannot hold true. 
REFERENCES
[1] J. Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds. Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, 2005.
[2] F. Galton, “Vox populi (the wisdom of crowds),” Nature, vol. 75, no. 7,
pp. 450–451, 1907.
[3] M. T. Maloney and J. H. Mulherin, “The complexity of price discovery
in an efficient market: the stock market reaction to the challenger crash,”
Journal of corporate finance, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 453–479, 2003.
[4] I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and
fiascoes. Houghton Mifflin Boston, 1982.
[5] K. Eliaz, D. Ray, and R. Razin, “Choice shifts in groups: A decision-
theoretic basis,” The American economic review, pp. 1321–1332, 2006.
[6] J. A. Stoner, “Risky and cautious shifts in group decisions: The influence
of widely held values,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 442–459, 1968.
[7] D. J. Isenberg, “Group polarization: a critical review and meta-analysis.”
Journal of personality and social psychology, vol. 50, no. 6, p. 1141,
1986.
[8] N. Roux and J. Sobel, “Group polarization in a model of information
aggregation,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7,
no. 4, pp. 202–32, 2015.
[9] P. M. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel, “Persuasion bias, social
influence, and unidimensional opinions,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 118, pp. 909–968, 2003.
[10] B. Golub and M. O. Jackson, “Naı¨ve Learning in Social Networks and
the Wisdom of Crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 112–149, Feb. 2010.
[11] V. Krishnamurthy and W. Hoiles, “Online reputation and polling sys-
tems: Data incest, social learning, and revealed preferences,” IEEE
Transactions on Computational Social Systems, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 164–
179, 2014.
[12] D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Opinion dynamics and learning in social
networks,” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–49,
2011.
[13] M. O. Jackson, Social and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008.
[14] S. Goyal, Connections: an introduction to the economics of networks.
Princeton University Press, 2012.
[15] C. P. Chamley, Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning.
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[16] V. Krishnamurthy and H. V. Poor, “Social learning and bayesian games
in multiagent signal processing: How do local and global decision
makers interact?” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine,, vol. 30, no. 3,
pp. 43–57, 2013.
[17] Y. Wang and P. Djuric, “Social learning with bayesian agents and random
decision making,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 63,
no. 12, pp. 3241–3250, 2015.
[18] V. Krishnamurthy, O. N. Gharehshiran, and M. Hamdi, “Interactive
sensing and decision making in social networks,” Foundations and
Trends in Signal Processing, vol. 7, no. 1-2, pp. 1–196, Apr. 2014.
[19] E. Mossel, A. Sly, and O. Tamuz, “Asymptotic learning on bayesian
social networks,” Probability Theory and Related Fields, vol. 158, no.
1-2, pp. 127–157, 2014.
[20] A. Jadbabaie, P. Molavi, A. Sandroni, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi, “Non-
bayesian social learning,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 76, no. 1,
pp. 210 – 225, 2012.
[21] E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. Simon and Schuster,
2003.
[22] V. Borkar and P. Varaiya, “Asymptotic agreement in distributed esti-
mation,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 27, no. 3, pp.
650–655, Jun 1982.
[23] J. N. Tsitsiklis and M. Athans, “Convergence and asymptotic agreement
in distributed decision problems,” Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 42–50, 1984.
[24] S. McLaughlin, V. Krishnamurthy, and S. Challa, “Managing data incest
in a distributed sensor network,” in IEEE International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP’03), vol. 5. IEEE,
2003, pp. V–269.
[25] N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games. New
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[26] A. Jadbabaie, J. Lin, and A. S. Morse, “Coordination of groups of mobile
autonomous agents using nearest neighbor rules,” IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 988–1001, 2003.
[27] M. Mesbahi and M. Egerstedt, Graph Theoretic Methods in Multiagent
Networks. Princeton University Press, 2010.
[28] D. Blackwell and L. Dubins, “Merging of opinions with increasing
information,” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 33, pp. 882
– 886, 1962.
[29] E. Lehrer and R. Smorodinsky, “Merging and learning,” Lecture Notes-
Monograph Series, pp. 147–168, 1996.
[30] D. Acemoglu, M. A. Dahleh, I. Lobel, and A. Ozdaglar, “Bayesian
learning in social networks,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78,
no. 4, pp. 1201–1236, 2011.
[31] M. Mueller-Frank, “A general framework for rational learning in social
networks,” Theoretical Economics, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1–40, 2013.
[32] A. Wilson, “Bounded memory and biases in information processing,”
Econometrica, vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 2257–2294, 2014.
[33] T. M. Cover, “A note on the two-armed bandit problem with finite
memory,” Information and Control, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 371–377, 1968.
[34] ——, “Hypothesis testing with finite statistics,” The Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics, pp. 828–835, 1969.
[35] L. Kontorovich, “Statistical estimation with bounded memory,” Statistics
and Computing, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1155–1164, 2012.
[36] M. E. Hellman and T. M. Cover, “Learning with finite memory,” The
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, pp. 765–782, 1970.
[37] T. M. Cover, M. A. Freedman, and M. E. Hellman, “Optimal finite
memory learning algorithms for the finite sample problem,” Information
and Control, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 49 – 85, 1976.
[38] T. M. Cover and M. E. Hellman, “The two-armed-bandit problem
with time-invariant finite memory,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 185–195, 1970.
[39] K. Drakopoulos, A. Ozdaglar, and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “On learning with
finite memory,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 59,
no. 10, pp. 6859–6872, 2013.
[40] M. H. DeGroot, “Reaching a consensus,” Journal of American Statistical
Association, vol. 69, pp. 118 – 121, 1974.
[41] A. Jadbabaie, P. Molavi, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi, “Information heterogene-
ity and the speed of learning in social networks,” Revise and Resubmit,
Review of Economic Studies, 2013.
[42] V. Bala and S. Goyal, “Learning from neighbours,” The Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 595–621, 1998.
[43] E. Eyster and M. Rabin, “Naive herding in rich-information settings,”
American economic journal: microeconomics, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 221–243,
2010.
[44] ——, “Extensive imitation is irrational and harmful,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, p. qju021, 2014.
[45] V. Krishnamurthy, Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes.
Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[46] M. Luca, “Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of yelp. com,”
Com (September 16, 2011). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Work-
ing Paper, no. 12-016, 2011.
[47] G. Gigerenzer and W. Gaissmaier, “Heuristic decision making,” Annual
review of psychology, vol. 62, pp. 451–482, 2011.
[48] G. Gigerenzer and D. G. Goldstein, “Reasoning the fast and frugal way:
models of bounded rationality,” Psychological review, vol. 103, no. 4,
p. 650, 1996.
[49] G. Gigerenzer and P. M. Todd, Simple heuristics that make us smart.
Oxford University Press, USA, 1999.
[50] R. Hegselmann and U. Krause, “Opinion dynamics driven by various
ways of averaging,” Computational Economics, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 381–
405, 2005.
[51] V. Grimm and F. Mengel, “An experiment on belief formation in
networks,” Available at SSRN 2361007, 2014.
[52] A. G. Chandrasekhar, H. Larreguy, and J. P. Xandri, “Testing models
of social learning on networks: Evidence from a lab experiment in the
field,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Tech. Rep., 2015.
[53] P. Molavi, A. Tahbaz-Salehi, and A. Jadbabaie, “Foundations of non-
bayesian social learning,” Columbia Business School Research Paper,
2015.
[54] M. Mueller-Frank and C. Neri, “A general model of boundedly rational
observational learning: Theory and experiment,” Available at SSRN
2566210, 2015.
[55] J. S. B. Evans, “In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning,”
Trends in cognitive sciences, vol. 7, no. 10, pp. 454–459, 2003.
[56] D. Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar Straus Giroux, 2011.
[57] ——, “Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral eco-
nomics,” The American economic review, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 1449–1475,
2003.
[58] I. Brocas and J. D. Carrillo, “Dual-process theories of decision-making:
A selective survey,” Journal of economic psychology, vol. 41, pp. 45–54,
2014.
[59] R. J. Aumann, “Agreeing to disagree,” The annals of statistics, pp. 1236–
1239, 1976.
[60] D. Fudenberg, The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press, 1998.
[61] H. P. Young, Strategic learning and its limits. Oxford university press,
2004.
[62] D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, and N. Vieille, “Informational externalities and
emergence of consensus,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 2,
pp. 979–994, 2009.
[63] J.-F. Mertens and S. Zamir, “Formulation of bayesian analysis for games
with incomplete information,” International Journal of Game Theory,
vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1–29, 1985.
[64] A. Brandenburger and E. Dekel, “Hierarchies of beliefs and common
knowledge,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 189–198,
1993.
[65] R. O’Donnell, Analysis of boolean functions. Cambridge University
Press, 2014.
[66] I. Benjamini, G. Kalai, and O. Schramm, “Noise sensitivity of boolean
functions and applications to percolation,” Publications Mathe´matiques
de l’Institut des Hautes E´tudes Scientifiques, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 5–43,
1999.
[67] E. Mossel, R. O’Donnell, and K. Oleszkiewicz, “Noise stability of
functions with low influences: invariance and optimality,” 46th Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 21–
30, 2005.
[68] Y. Peres, “Noise stability of weighted majority,” arXiv preprint
math/0412377, 2004.
[69] W. S. McCulloch and W. Pitts, “A logical calculus of the ideas immanent
in nervous activity,” The bulletin of mathematical biophysics, vol. 5,
no. 4, pp. 115–133, 1943.
[70] J. J. Hopfield, “Neural networks and physical systems with emergent
collective computational abilities,” Proceedings of the national academy
of sciences, vol. 79, no. 8, pp. 2554–2558, 1982.
[71] D. A. Levin, Y. Peres, and E. L. Wilmer, Markov Chains and Mixing
Times. American Mathematical Society, 2009.
[72] F. Martinelli, Lectures on Glauber Dynamics for Discrete Spin Models.
Springer, 1999.
[73] M. Ostilli, E. Yoneki, I. X. Y. Leung, J. F. F. Mendes, P. Lio´, and
J. Crowcroft, “Statistical mechanics of rumour spreading in network
communities,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 2331–2339,
2010.
[74] J.-P. Nadal, D. Phan, M. B. Gordon, and J. Vannimenus, “Multiple
equilibria in a monopoly market with heterogeneous agents and exter-
nalities,” Quantitative Finance, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 557–568, 2005.
[75] M. H. Afrasiabi, R. Guerin, and S. S. Venkatesh, “Opinion formation
in ising networks,” in Information Theory and Applications Workshop.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–10.
[76] D. V. Lindley, Introduction to probability and statistics from bayesian
viewpoint. part I: Probability, Part II: inference. CUP Archive, 1965.
[77] M. H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions, ser. Wiley Classics
Library. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1969.
[78] L. J. Savage, The foundations of statistics. Courier Dover Publications,
1972.
[79] J. O. Berger, Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis. Springer,
1985.
[80] P. Billingsley, Probability and Measure, 3rd ed. Wiley-Interscience,
1995.
[81] M. A. Rahimian and A. Jadbabaie, “Learning without recall in directed
circles and rooted trees,” American Control Conference, pp. 4222–4227,
2015.
[82] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, ser. A
Wiley-Interscience publication. Wiley, 2006.
[83] E. Seneta, Non-negative matrices and Markov chains. Springer, 2006.
[84] R. A. Brualdi, The mutually beneficial relationship of graphs and
matrices. American Mathematical Soc., 2011, no. 115.
[85] T. Gagnon-Bartsch and M. Rabin, “Naive social learning, mislearning,
and unlearning,” Working Paper.
[86] M. A. Rahimian, S. Shahrampour, and A. Jadbabaie, “Learning without
recall by random walks on directed graphs,” IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), 2015.
[87] S. Boyd, A. Ghosh, B. Prabhakar, and D. Shah, “Randomized gossip
algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 52, no. 6,
pp. 2508–2530, 2006.
[88] A. Tahbaz-Salehi and A. Jadbabaie, “Consensus over ergodic stationary
graph processes,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 55,
no. 1, pp. 225–230, 2010.
[89] J. R. Norris, Markov Chains. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[90] M. A. Rahimian and A. Jadbabaie, “Learning without recall: A case for
log-linear learning,” 5th IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and
Control in Networked Systems, 2015.
[91] S. Shahrampour and A. Jadbabaie, “Exponentially fast parameter es-
timation in networks using distributed dual averaging,” 52nd IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 6196–6201, 2013.
[92] K. Rahnama Rad and A. Tahbaz-Salehi, “Distributed parameter esti-
mation in networks,” 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), pp. 5050–5055, 2010.
[93] A. Nedic´, A. Olshevsky, and C. A. Uribe, “Nonasymptotic convergence
rates for cooperative learning over time-varying directed graphs,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1410.1977, 2014.
[94] A. Lalitha, A. Sarwate, and T. Javidi, “Social learning and distributed
hypothesis testing,” IEEE International Symposium on Information The-
ory, pp. 551–555, 2014.
[95] S. Bandyopadhyay and S.-J. Chung, “Distributed estimation using
bayesian consensus filtering,” American Control Conference, pp. 634–
641, 2014.
[96] G. L. Gilardoni and M. K. Clayton, “On reaching a consensus using
DeGroot’s iterative pooling,” The Annals of Statistics, pp. 391–401,
1993.
[97] M. J. Rufo, J. Martin, C. J. Pe´rez et al., “Log-linear pool to combine
prior distributions: A suggestion for a calibration-based approach,”
Bayesian Analysis, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 411–438, 2012.
[98] J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell, Finite Markov Chains. New York: Van
Nostrand, 1960.
[99] M. A. Rahimian, P. Molavi, and A. Jadbabaie, “(Non-) bayesian learning
without recall,” IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp.
5730–5735, 2014.
